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I.

PARTIES IN THE PROCEEDING BELOW

All parties involved in the proceeding below are listed
on the caption page of this Brief,

Third-party defendant, CCI

Mechanical, Inc., did not take part in the proceedings in the
District Court and it does not take part in this appeal.
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IV.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THIS PROCEEDING

This is an appeal taken from an order granting summary
judgment in favor of defendants issued Iqy Judge James S. Sawaya
of the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. S78-2-2(3)(j) (1990).
V.
1.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the District Court correctly find that no com-

pensable bodily injury had been manifested in any plaintiff?
2.

Did the District Court correctly rule that mere

exposure to asbestos dust, in the absence of any resultant physical injury, is insufficient ground upon vrthich to base a claim for
damages due to negligent infliction of emotional distress?
3.

Did the District Court correctly rule that plain-

tiffs are not entitled to damages for medical surveillance when
there is no evidence that such surveillance is reasonably necessary for detection of the alleged latent disease?
VI.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

The determinative provision in! this case is Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 56(c) which provides in part: "The judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
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VII.
1*

On

STATEMENT OP THE CASE

February

10,

1989,

appellants

Tom

Hansen,

Douglas A. Hilton, Mike Mackintosh, Bruce Silcox and Russell
Vickers, plaintiffs

in the action below,

(hereinafter collec-

tively referred to as "plaintiffs") filed suit in Third District
Court, Salt Lake County (hereinafter "District Court"), seeking
damages allegedly suffered as a result of exposure to asbestos
particles.

Plaintiffs alleged six causes of action:

common law

fraud, negligence, strict liability, negligent misrepresentation,
intentional

infliction

of

disregard/punitive damages.
2.

On February

emotional

distress

and

reckless

(Complaint at HH 35-61, R. 008-015).
22, 1990, defendants Mountain

Fuel

Supply Company ("Mountain Fuel"), Roger Barrus and Roger Morse,
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "defendants"), filed a
motion for summary judgment dismissing all of plaintiffs' causes
of action on the grounds that no plaintiff suffered any compensable physical injury or emotional distress.
3.

After reviewing the record, the memoranda of the

parties, and the testimony and admissions of the plaintiffs as
contained in their responses to written interrogatories and in
their depositions, and after hearing oral argument, the District
Court, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, District Court Judge presiding, granted defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Minute Entry dated May 21, 1990.
4.

in a

(R. 540).

On July 23, 1990, Judge Sawaya entered an Order

Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing with
prejudice all plaintiffs' causes of action on the ground that no
-2-

bodily injury had been manifested

in atiy plaintiff.

The court

granted plaintiffs leave to re-file their complaint in the event
that

a bodily

542-43).

injury manifested

(The Order

Granting

itself

in

Defendants1

the

future.

Motion

for

(R.

Summary

Judgment is reproduced in the Addendum of this Brief.)
5.

On August 20, 1990, plaintiffs filed with the Utah

Supreme Court an appeal from the District Court's dismissal of
their claims.

(R. 544-45).
VIII.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In July of 1986, plaintiffs began working on a construction project

to renovate the basement of Mountain Fuel's

downtown office building.

(R.004.)

At the time, each plaintiff

was an employee of CCI Mechanical, Inc., which provided construction services under a subcontract with Mpuntain Fuel.
261-62, 281, 298, 319.)

(R.240-41,

While engaged in the renovation project,

plaintiffs removed some insulating material that later proved to
contain asbestos.

(R.007.)

For the purposes of its Motion for

Summary Judgment, and for purposes of this appeal, Mountain Fuel
concedes that, for a period of time, plaintiffs were exposed to
airborne asbestos particles.
The District Court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims is
supported by the uncontroverted medical evidence in the record.
In

their

described

responses
the

to defendants'

immediate

effects

of

interrogatories, plaintiffs
the

alleged

include transitory coughing, wheezing, tightness

exposure

to

in the chest,

headache and eye irritation (R.251, 271, 289, 309, 328.)

None of

the plaintiffs, however, sought medical treatment for the claimed
-3-

immediate

effects

of

the

exposure.

In

May

of

1987,

Dr.

Battigelli of the Occupational Clinic for the Department of Family and Preventive Medicine at the University of Utah, examined
Hansen, Hilton, Silcox and Vickers

in connection with attorney

Robert L. Stolebarger*s representation of plaintiffs.

In a let-

ter to Mr. Stolebarger, Dr. Battigelli stated that plaintiffs'
exposure to asbestos while working at Mountain Fuel was "limited
and perhaps inconsequential."

(R.372-74.)

Dr. Battigelli stated

that "[t]he workers by and large denied acute bouts of coughing,
choking

and

exposure."

related

symptoms

(R.373.)

which would

Dr. Battigelli

suggest

concluded

overwhelming

that

"none of

these individuals presented. . . evidence of respiratory disorders which could be meaningfully related to [the Mountain Fuel]
exposure."

(id.)

Dr. Battigelli was the only physician to exam-

ine plaintiffs and his opinion was uncontroverted before the District Court.
The District

Court's

ruling

is also

supported

by a

review of the evidence presented with respect to each individual
plaintiff.
to

Although plaintiff Tom Hansen stated in his responses

interrogatories

and

in his deposition

that

he

experienced

coughing, respiratory distress, chest tightness, headache and eye
irritation as a result of the immediate exposure to asbestos particles, (R.251.) he was not treated for these initial symptoms.
(R.252.)

Indeed, Hansen has never sought nor received treatment

for any alleged injury relating to the occurrences complained of
in this lawsuit.
deposition

that

(R.252-53.)
he

still

Although Hansen claimed

had
-4-

"recurring

chest

in his

colds"

and

"shortness of breath/' no health care provider has ever attributed these symptoms to asbestos exposure.

(R.242-43.)

Moreover,

although he alleged that he experienced anxiety and sleeplessness
worrying

about potential

psychological
his

alleged

undisputed

injury, he never sought

therapy or treatment
exposure

that

to asbestos.

Hansen

has

for any symptom
(R.243.)

never been

treated

nor

received

relating to

In fact,

it is

for any

injury

allegedly received as a result of the occurrences complained of
in this

lawsuit.

(R.253.)

He has not

incurred

any medical

expenses or claimed any loss of wages, earnings or income as a
result of any alleged physical or psychological injury.

(R.258.)

He can only guess as to whether he has sustained or will sustain
any

permanent

injury

as

a

result

of

exposure

to

asbestos.

(R.242-43, 245.)
The evidence before the District Court with respect to
plaintiff Douglas Hilton showed that he experienced only coughing, wheezing, tightness in the chest and eye irritation during
the period he was allegedly exposed to asbestos.

(R.271-72.)

He

did not contend that he has any permanent physical injury as a
result of the alleged exposure and he admitted before the District Court that no health care practitioner has ever told him he
would

develop

(R.266-67.)

asbestosis

or

any

asbestos-related

disease.

Hilton stated that he suffered "loss of sleep, wor-

rying about what might happen in the future due to exposure to
asbestos."

(R.272.)

His anxiety lasted for about one month,

during which time he was also worried about the results of exposure

to

other

toxic

chemicals

-5-

in

an

unrelated

incident.

(R.265-66.)

It is disputed that Hilton never sought treatment

for anxiety in connection with the alleged asbestos exposure.
(R.265-66.)

Although he declared his intention to see a health

care practitioner to monitor the effects of exposure, Hilton did
not have a check-up exam in 1988 or 1989.

(R.263.)

No health

care practitioner has ever told Hilton that he will develop
asbestos-related disease, (R.267), and all diagnostic tests performed on Hilton were negative for damage due to asbestos.

Id.

Hilton has incurred no medical expenses, or loss of wages, earnings or income due to any alleged injury.
The District Court's ruling

(R.268, 275-77.)

is also supported by a

review of the evidence with regard to plaintiff, Mike Mackintosh.
Mackintosh admitted that he did not suffer any ill effects at all
from the alleged exposure to asbestos.

(R.282, 289.)

He admit-

ted that he neither sought nor received a medical examination
after the alleged exposure in 1986, nor did he submit to an examination in 1987, 1988, or 1989.

(R.286.)

He admitted that he

has never sought or received treatment for any alleged physical
or psychological injury received as a result of any occurrence
complained in this lawsuit.

(R.283, 290-91.) Mackintosh further

admitted that he does not know of any permanent injury he has
sustained as a result of asbestos exposure, and he admitted that
it was "pure guess work" as to whether he would develop any
asbestos-related disease in the future (R.284-85, 289-90.) Moreover, although he alleged that he suffered from severe anxiety
concerning his future medical condition, (R.292), he has never
sought nor received medical treatment for psychological injury
-6-

due

to

the

alleged

exposure.

(R.283,

290-91.)

The

uncontroverted evidence before the District Court was that Mackintosh has not received any bodily injury, incurred any medical
expenses, or claimed
result

of

any

any lost wages, earnings or

alleged

injury

relating

to

income as a

asbestos

exposure.

(R.286, 292-95.)
There was also ample evidence to support the District
Court's ruling with regard to plaintiff, Bruce Silcox.
admitted

that

he experienced

"severe coughing

and

Silcox

respiratory

distress, chest tightness, headaches, and severe eye irritation"
immediately

following

the alleged exposure.

(R.309-310.)

He

admitted that he has never sought nor received medical treatment
for any physical or psychological injury alleged in this lawsuit.
(R.310-12.)

Although Silcox claimed that he experienced conges-

tion, coughing and shortness of breath for some time after the
initial
health

exposure,
care

the

uncontroverted

practitioner

ever

related to asbestos exposure.

told

evidence
him

(R.321.)

those

showed

that

symptoms

no

were

Dr. Battigelli's exami-

nation of Silcox revealed no physical condition attributable to
asbestos exposure.
that

his

exposure

examination
and

(R.3Q6, 339.)
between

(R.347.)

that

In fact, Dr. Battigelli told Silcox

was negative
"there

wasn't

for any effect
anything

to

of

worry

asbestos
about."

Furthermore, Silcox admitted that any connection

his physical

symptoms

guesswork" on his part.

and asbestos exposure was

(R.303.)

"pure

Finally, Silcox admitted that

he has not incurred any medical expense or claimed any loss of

-7-

wages,

earnings

or

income

as a result

relating to asbestos exposure.

of

any

alleged

injury

(R.313-16.)

The District Court also considered the undisputed evidence with regard to plaintiff, Russell Vickers.

Vickers admit-

ted that he experienced coughing, wheezing, shortness of breath,
chest tightness, headaches and severe eye irritation immediately
following the alleged exposure to asbestos.

(R.328.)

There was

evidence before the District Court that Silcox was examined by
Dr. Battigelli at the Rocky Mountain Center for Occupational and
Environmental
determining
exposure.

Health

on November

20, 1986

the extent of his injury,
(R.369.)

for the purpose of

if any, due to asbestos

But Dr. Battigelli's report states that he

did not find "any evidence of adverse effects" from the asbestos
exposure.
that

his

(R.320.)

(id.)
wheezing

The District Court considered Vickers1
was

a

symptom

of

significant

claim

duration.

But it is an undisputed fact that no health care prac-

titioner has ever told Vickers that his wheezing may be attributed

to his

inhaling

asbestos

fibers.

(id.)

Vickers

could

attribute no other present symptom to asbestos exposure and no
health care practitioner has ever told him that he has any physical symptom or condition that may be attributed to asbestos exposure.
anxiety

(R.320-21.)

Although he claimed that he suffered severe

associated with

the uncertainty

of his

future medical

condition, Vickers admitted that he has never sought nor received
any treatment for depression, anxiety, or any form of emotional
distress.

(R.321-22.)

-8-

The

District

Court

also

considered

the

evidence

of

Vickers1 second examination by Dr. Battigelli in 1987 who stated
in a letter to Vickers1 counsel that there was no evidence of any
respiratory disorder

that could be related to the exposure to

asbestos at Mountain Fuel.

(R.372-74.)

Although Vickers stated

that he intended to see a physician iri the future, he admitted
that

he

had

(R.324-25.)

not

had

a

physical

examination

since

1987.

Vickers also admitted that he could only guess as to

whether he had sustained any permanent injury as a result of any
alleged exposure to asbestos.

(R.324.)

Finally Vickers admitted

that he has not incurred any medical expense or claimed any loss
of wages, earnings or income as a result of any occurrence complained of in this lawsuit.

(R.323-24, 332-335.)

There was abundant uncontroverted evidence before the
District Court to support its decision granting summary judgment
in favor of defendants.

It is undisputed that none of the plain-

tiffs have ever been diagnosed by a health care practitioner as
presently suffering from asbestosis or dny other asbestos-related
disease.

(R.242-43, 267, 282-83, 302, 320, 341-43.)

No plain-

tiff contends that he presently suffers from any form of cancer
arising from exposure to asbestos; only that he may develop cancer in the future.

(R.254-55, 274-75, 292, 312-13, 331.)

It is

undisputed that none of the plaintiffs have ever received medical
treatment

for

any

resulting

from

physical

or psychological

any occurrence

complained

of

injury
in this

allegedly
lawsuit.

(R.252-53, 272-73, 289-91, 310-11, 329-30.)

Since their initial

examinations

in

by

Dr.

Battigelli
-9-

conducted

connection

with

anticipated litigation, none of the plaintiffs have had further
medical evaluations to detect the presence of, or to evaluate the
future risk of cancer or asbestos-related disease.
286, 299, 325-26.)
plaintiffs1

(R.243, 263,

Finally, the District Court relied on each

admission to conclude that none of the plaintiffs

have incurred any medical expense or claimed any loss of wages,
earnings or income as a result of the alleged asbestos exposure.
(R.255-58, 275-78, 292-95, 313-16, 332-35.)
IX.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

None of the plaintiffs have a presently existing personal injury that would entitle them to damages. Under Utah law,
a claimant must prove the fact of damages with reasonable certainty.
1986).

Sawyers v. F.M.A. Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah
Mere exposure to asbestos, even when accompanied by ini-

tial symptoms of coughing, wheezing and eye irritation, does not
constitute sufficient injury to maintain a cause of action for
damages.

In the present case, no plaintiff has alleged nor has

any plaintiff produced even a shred of evidence to show presently
existing asbestos-related disease or injury.

Most courts also

hold that a claimant cannot recover for the increased risk or
expectation
asbestos.

of

a future disease associated with exposure to

A showing of "enhanced risk" does not establish the

fact of damages with reasonable certainty.

The District Court,

therefore, correctly dismissed plaintiffs' causes of action for
personal injury.
The District Court also correctly dismissed plaintiffs'
claims

for

damages

for

negligent
-10-

infliction

of

emotional

distress.

In the present case, there is no genuine issue as to

whether any plaintiff has sustained bodily harm or resulting illness.

No plaintiff

has demonstrated

any significant

physical

injury accompanying the initial exposure to asbestos, or any psychological

injury caused by the emotional trauma of the event.

In the absence of some bodily harm or illness, the District Court
properly dismissed plaintiffs1 claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
The District Court also correctly ruled that plaintiffs
are not entitled to damages for medical surveillance.

In cases

of exposure to toxic chemicals, damages for medical surveillance
are only available when
examinations

are reasonable

latent disease.
no

medical

it can be shown that periodic medical
to detect

and

treat

In the present case, plaintiffs have proffered

evidence

asbestos-related

and necessary

indicating

disease

health maintenance.

requires

that

early

anything

more

detection
than

of

routine

Because there is no evidence demonstrating

that medical surveillance

is reasonable or necessary,

the Dis-

trict Court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim for medical surveillance damages should be sustained.
The strongest case any of these plaintiffs can present
is that

they were exposed to asbestos dust and that they were

subject

to anecdotal, transitory, subjective and non-verifiable

complaints

and apprehensions.

There

is no objective evidence,

let alone medical evidence, which demonstrates a real injury to
any of these plaintiffs.
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Under the better reasoned cases, and as a matter of
sound tort policy, this Court should sustain the District Court.
A tort has not been committed, nor do statutes of limitations
even begin to run, until a demonstrable injury has occurred.

In

this day and age of environmental awareness, asbestos in school
and office buildings, toxic fumes and dusts, and air and water
pollution, virtually

all citizens could mount

a case against

someone as good as the one plaintiffs postulate here.

The law

should discourage such premature filings and require a verifiable
and objectively demonstrable injury.

This policy will serve both

defendants and claimants since those claimants who ultimately
suffer real injuries would not be told the statute began to run
against them when they first coughed and wheezed.
X.

ARGUMENT

Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact.

When the record, "taken as whole could not lead a

rational trier-of-fact to find for the non-moving party, summary
judgment should be granted because there is no 'genuine issue for
trial.'"

In re Japanese Electronics Products Antitrust Litiga-

tion, 723 F.2d 238 (3rd Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Matsushita
Electric Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106
S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 552 (1986) (citations omitted).

When the non-moving party has designated no specific facts

that show there is a genuine issue for trial, summary judgment is
proper even though the moving party has not produced specific
affidavits or other material negating the claim.
-12-

Celotex Corp.

v,

Catrett,

L.Ed.2d

477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S. Ct.

265, 274

(1986).

2548, 2553, 91

In the present case, plaintiffs have

introduced absolutely no evidence that would raise an issue of
material fact.

Their mere allegations, unsupported by the evi-

dence or affidavits, are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of
fact.

Thornock v. Cookf

604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979).

conclusory statements are insufficient.
P.2d 857 (Utah 1983).
are

insufficient.

1985).

Their mere

Norton v. Blackham, 669

Their unsubstantiated opinions or beliefs

Treloqqan

v. Trelogqan,

699 P.2d

747

(Utah

Because plaintiffs have raised no genuine issue of mate-

rial fact, the District Court correctly dismissed their claims as
a matter of law.
A.

None of the Plaintiffs Have a Presently
Existing Compensable Personal Injury.
All of plaintiffs' causes of action were properly dis-

missed by the District Court on the grounds that no presently
existing bodily injury has been manifested in any plaintiff.
542-43.)
alleged

None
that

mesothelioma

of

they
or

the

plaintiffs

presently

any other

plaintiffs have attempted
minor

symptoms

dust.

associated

have

have

demonstrated

asbestosis,

asbestos-related

lung

disease.

or

(R.
even

cancer,
Instead,

to base their cause of action on the
with

immediate

exposure

to

airborne

They claim they temporarily experienced severe coughing,

wheezing, tightness in the chest, headaches and eye irritation.
No plaintiff ever sought or received treatment for those symptoms
or even alleged that such symptoms ever required any treatment.
Indeed,

the

symptoms

plaintiffs

described
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could

be

associated

with exposure to ordinary dust in the air.

The District Court

correctly held that such symptoms are insufficient as a matter of
law to support a claim for damages.
In their brief on appeal, plaintiffs have argued, as
they did in the District Court, that mere exposure to asbestos
dust creates a cause of action for damages.

They contend that

their inhalation of asbestos fibers was an "unconsented-to invasion" resulting in "a tangible risk of major disease.11
Appellants at 17 (citation omitted)).

(Brief of

Although plaintiffs have

averred that they are not seeking damages for "enhanced risk of
disease", (Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment at 14; R.429-30), their theory of recovery amounts to
exactly that.
Plaintiffs have relied the case of Avers v. Jackson
Township, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987), for the proposition
that mere exposure to a toxic substance constitutes a compensable
harm.

(Brief of Appellants at 16-17.)

The Ayers court, however,

did not uphold a decision awarding damages for personal injury or
for enhanced risk of disease.

In fact, the court held that the

claimants

damages

could

not

recover

for

an

unquantifiable

enhanced risk of disease resulting from exposure to toxic chemicals.

525 A.2d at 304-05.

While the court suggested it might

recognize a cause of action for "quantifiable enhanced risk," it
did not decide the issue.

(Id.)

Plaintiffs have cited other cases in which it was held
that a claim for enhanced risk of disease could be maintained
when

there

is expert

testimony
-14-

concluding

with

a reasonable

degree of medical p r o b a b i l i t y that a l a t e n t d i s e a s e w i l l manifest
itself.

E.g.,

Brafford v.

(D.C. Colo. 1984)
degree

of

Susquehanna Corp.,

586 F.

Supp.

14

(when expert opinion concluded with reasonable

medical

probability

that

there

had been

chromosomal

damage caused by exposure to high r a d i a t i o n , court recognized an
"increased r i s k of
tional,

Inc.,

cancer" c l a i m ) ; Villftri v. Terminix

663 F. Supp. 727, 735 (E.D. Pa. 1989)

Interna-

(plaintiffs

who s u f f e r e d p h y s i c a l symptoms from exposure to p e s t i c i d e s had an
injury g i v i n g
Most

courts,

rise

to a claim for

however,

do not

enhanced r i s k of

recognize

a cause of

disease).
action

for

enhanced r i s k of d i s e a s e in t o x i c exposure c a s e s because proof of
damages i s too u n c e r t a i n .

Even when a claimant can show by medi-

c a l testimony that i t i s more l i k e l y than not he w i l l contract an
asbestos-related

disease

cannot begin to show,
until

the d i s e a s e

in

the

future^

which p l a i n t i f f s

here

compensation should be denied u n l e s s

is manifest.

See Anderson v.

C o . , 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986)

and

W. R. Grace &

( i n e q u i t y would r e s u l t

if

recovery were allowed based on mere mathematical p r o b a b i l i t y that

1

The remaining cases cited by plaintiffs ih support of their claim for
personal injury damages, are not apposite here either because the claimant was
able to demonstrate presently existing injury, Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff diagnosed with asbestosis and
lung cancer must sue for all damages in one action, including damages for
undiagnosed mesothelioma), or because the claimant was not awarded damages for
personal injury or enhanced risk. E.g., Ayers, ^25 A.2d at 308; Haggerty v. L
& L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315, reh'g denied, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir.
1986) (seaman exposed to toxic chemicals did not state a claim for enhanced
risk even though his body absorbed chemicals arid doctor verified exposure);
Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 824
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (claimants recovered only the cost of diagnostic examinations); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S,W.2d 431 (Term. 1982) (claimants recovered only damages for emotional distress when they and their children were exposed to pesticides in their water sufpply).
-15-

the harm will occur); Eagle richer Industries, Inc. v. Cox, 481
So.2d 517 (Fla. App. 1985), review denied, 492 So.2d 1331 (Fla.
1986) (plaintiff who had introduced testimony of a greater than
50 percent chance of contracting cancer in the future could not
recover damages but could bring a second action for damages if
2
and when cancer a c t u a l l y d e v e l o p e d ) .
The Utah Supreme Court has never recognized a cause of
a c t i o n based on the p o s s i b i l i t y that an injury may occur in the
future.

Under Utah law,

" [ t ] h e f a c t of damages must be proven

with reasonable c e r t a i n t y . "

Sawyers v.

P.2d

Atkin

773,

774

(Utah

1986);

F.M.A. Leasing C o . ,

Wright

& Miles

v.

722

Mountain

S t a t e s Telephone & Telegraph Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985)
( t h e standard of proof required for e s t a b l i s h i n g the f a c t of damages i s g r e a t e r than that required for e s t a b l i s h i n g the amount).
To a l l o w a p l a i n t i f f

to recover for mere exposure t o a t o x i c s u b -

s t a n c e would permit a claim for damages based on pure
tion.

As a matter of

law,

a claim for

2

"enhanced risk"

speculais

not

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that in cases involving suspected carcinogens, i t may be appropriate to apply the "discovery rule" and to
t o l l the statute of limitations until actual discovery of the injury. See
Maughan v. SW Servicing Inc., 758 P.2d 1381, 1385 (10th Cir. 1985) (applying
Utah law). In Maughan, Judge Winder noted that "where there are exceptional
circumstances that would make application of the law unjust, [the Utah Supreme
Court] has adopted the discovery rule by judicial action." Id. at 1385 (quoting Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983)). The court
further noted that "[t]he discovery rule has been applied to t o l l the statute
of limitations until discovery of the injury and i t s causation in latent d i s ease and malpractice cases in numerous jurisdictions." Id. (citing, inter
alia, Louisville v. Jones-Manvilie Products Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979);
Hariq v. Jones-Manville Products Corp., 394 A.2d 299 (Md. 1978)).
-16-

c o g n i z a b l e in Utah.

Atkin, 709 P.2d at 336 (amount of l o s s must

be shown by evidence that r i s e s above mere s p e c u l a t i o n ) ; s e e a l s o
Acculoq, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728,j732 (Utah 1984)

(damages

must not be so i n d e f i n i t e so as to allow the jury to s p e c u l a t e as
t o the amount).
Courts that have considered claims brought by v i c t i m s
of a s b e s t o s exposure have required more proof of injury than the
mere f a c t of exposure and the minor discomfort that
it.

accompanies

In Burns v. Jaquavs Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. App.

1987),

56 r e s i d e n t s of a t r a i l e r park l o c a t e d near an a s b e s t o s

mine were exposed

to

airborne a s b e s t o s

fibers.

Each

person's

cumulative exposure to a s b e s t o s p a r t i c l e $ was found to be g r e a t e r
than the average exposure of workers in the a s b e s t o s mines or in
the m i l l i n g

and manufacturing

asbestos fibers

industries.

in t h e i r lungs.

All

plaintiffs

had

The court presumed that some of

them would develop a s b e s t o s i s or a s b e s t o s - r e l a t e d d i s e a s e .

Id.

at 30.

The t r i a l c o u r t , however, granted summary judgment d i s -

missing

the p l a i n t i f f s '

claim for damages for personal

3

injury.

The Utah Court of Appeals recently disciissed "increased risk" as i t
applies to causation in medical malpractice cases. See George v. LPS Hospit a l , 797 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Utah App. 1990) ( l i a b i l i t y may attach when the negligence of the defendant i s a substantial factor [rather than the sole factor]
in bringing about injury). The court quoted Section 323(a) of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (1965) for the proposition that one who undertakes to render
services to another and does so negligently, i s subject to l i a b i l i t y for the
resulting physical harm i f his negligence increased the risk of such harm.
797 P.2d 1122 n.5 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts S 323(a)). The holding in George i s inapplicable in the present case because Mountain Fuel did
not undertake to perform services for p l a i n t i f f s and because no bodily injury
has occurred in t h i s case. In any event, George cannot be construed as creating a cause of action for increased risk of harm in the absence of actual
bodily harm.
-17-

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision,
stating:
It is clear from the record that none of the
plaintiffs has been diagnosed as having
asbestosis. Some of the plaintiffs claim to
be suffering from mental anguish as a result
of the exposure to asbestos, but there is no
competent evidence of any physical impairment
or harm caused by this exposure. "The threat
of future harm, not yet realized, is not
enough."
Id. (quoting Prosser & Keaton on The Law of Torts, S 30 at 165
(5th ed. (1984)).
In Burns, the Arizona Court of Appeals

adopted the

rationale articulated by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals when
it adjudicated

the same question

in connection with

a claim

brought under the Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA").

In

Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3rd Cir.
1985), a group of railroad workers sought to recover damages for
asbestos-related

injuries.

The court held that, although the

workers had been exposed to asbestos, the resultant "subclinical
injury" was insufficient as a matter of law to create a cause of
action.

Id. at 942.

The court noted that, in the context of

asbestos-related torts, to recognize a cause of action for mere
exposure

to asbestos would

allow

"seemingly

healthy

railroad

workers . . . who might never manifest injury" to being a federal
claim for personal injury.

Jtd. The court stated:

It is obvious that proof of damages in such
cases would be highly speculative, likely
resulting in windfalls for those who would
never take ill and insufficient compensation
for those who do. Requiring manifest injury
as a necessary element of an asbestos-related
tort action avoids these problems and best
serves the underlying purposes of tort law:
-18-

the
compensation
suffered.

of

victims

who

have

Id. (emphasis added) ( c i t a t i o n s omitted.)
Since

the

denied claims for
fact
proof

that

many courts

have

asbestos exposure for the same reason.

The

asbestos

decision

in

Schweitzer,

inhalation may cause injury

is

insufficient

of damage or loss to maintain a cause of action

absence

of

some

manifestation
4
asbestos-related disease.

of

presently

in the
existing

In a recent decision from the United S t a t e s

District

Court for the D i s t r i c t of Hawaii, the cpurt recognized the need
to e s t a b l i s h objective c r i t e r i a for a s b e s t o s - r e l a t e d claims.

In

In Re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1567-67,
(D. Hawaii 1990), the court noted that over 20 million Americans
have had s i g n i f i c a n t exposure to asbestos and t h a t in many c a s e s ,
such

people

suffer

no

functional

impairment

as

a

result.

Although the presence of asbestos f i b e r s in the lungs may cause
s u b - c l i n i c a l changes in lung t i s s u e , the court was of the opinion
t h a t such e f f e c t s of asbestos exposure did not c o n s t i t u t e a compensable injury.

I d . at 1567.

The couift concluded t h a t i t was

4

The following courts are among those that have held that damages for
exposure to asbestos are inappropriate unless and until asbestos-related d i s ease i s manifest: In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Casesy 734 F. Supp, 1563 (D.
Hawaii 1990); Burns v. Jaguays Min. Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. App. 1987);
DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705 (Ariz. App. 1987); Mauro v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 542 A.2d 16 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1988), aff'd sub
nom. Mauro v. Raymark Industries, et a l . f 561 A.id 527 (N.J. 1989); Devlin v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super. 1985); Pollack v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 686 F. Supp. 489 (D.N.J. 1988); Lavelle v. Owens Corning
Fiberglass Corp., 507 N.E.2d 476 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1.987); Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail), 758 F.2d 936 (3rd Cir. 1985).
-19-

"sheer speculation to measure the loss that plaintiff may have
suffered for pleural plaques alone since sub-clinical conditions
such as pleural plaques or pleural thickening are normally not
associated with physical impairment."
neither

special

damages

Id.

The court held that

nor general damages

were

appropriate

without a showing of chronic pain or impairment:
Plaintiffs must show a compensable harm by
adducing objective testimony of a functional
impairment due to asbestos exposure.
A
claimant's subjective testimony as to shortness of breath and fatigue without more is
not sufficient.
In other words, the mere
presence of asbestos fibers, plural thickening
or
plural
plaques
in
the
lung
unaccompanied by objective verifiable functional impairment is not enough.
Id. at 1567 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted.)
While the Hawaii District Court focused the inquiry on
the degree of impairment

instead of the fact of injury, under

either approach, the result

is the same.

Sub-clinical injury

without presently existing bodily harm does not amount to reasonably certain proof of damages due to asbestos exposure, and,
under Utah law, such a claim must be dismissed.

See Sawyers v.

F.M.A. Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986) ("fact of damages must be proven with reasonable certainty").
There is no genuine issue of fact in the instant case
as to whether any of the plaintiffs have manifested any presently
existing asbestos-related disease.

There was no medical evidence

before the District Court as to whether or to what extent plaintiffs in this case have suffered "sub-clinical" injury.

Assum-

ing, arguendo, plaintiffs have asbestos fibers in their lungs,

-20-

still they may never develop any disease or suffer any disability.

Apart from sub-cellular impact, plaintiffs have not alleged

that any of them suffered
exposure to asbestos.

injury or impairment

as a result of

No plaintiff was treated for symptoms of

immediate exposure to asbestos.

No plainjtiff alleged that he has

any permanent injury as a result of exposure and there is no medical opinion in the record to show that any plaintiff

is likely

to have permanent injury as a result of fexposure. The only physician to examine plaintiffs concluded that "none of these individuals presented

. . • evidence of respiratory disorders which

could be meaningfully related to [the Mountain Fuel] exposure."
(R.373.)

No

plaintiff

alleged

that

he

incurred

any

medical

expenses and no plaintiff claimed any loss of wages, earnings or
income

as

a

result

of

any

incident

alleged

(R.255-58, 275-78, 292-95, 313-16, 332-3$.)
symptoms

of discomfort

compensable.

caused by

in

this

lawsuit.

Plaintiffs' initial

inhaling dust

are simply not

It is respectfully submitted that the authorities

discussed above have dismissed stronger Claims than those in the
instant case.

As a matter of law, plaintiffs simply have not

proffered reasonably certain proof of daimages, and the District
Court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for damages for personal
injury should be sustained.
B.

Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Damages For
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.
Plaintiffs

are not entitled

infliction of emotional distress.

td damages

for negligent

Although the plaintiffs have

claimed that they experienced insomnia ana general anxiety, none

-21-

of them have alleged that they suffer from "cancerphobia" or any
other substantial psychological disturbance.
complete

absence

of

any

physical

injury,

In addition to the
none

of

them

have

alleged that they experienced any physical symptom resulting from
emotional distress.
received treatment

Furthermore, no plaintiff has ever sought or
for depression, anxiety, or any form of emo-

tional distress or any physical illness caused by emotional distress.

Under Utah

law, plaintiffs

cannot

recover damages

for

negligent infliction of such emotional distress because they have
not

demonstrated

that

they have suffered

resulting

illness or

bodily harm.
The Supreme Court of Utah recently recognized a cause
of

action

for negligent

infliction of emotional distress.

In

Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988), the Court sustained
an award of damages for negligent

infliction of emotional dis-

tress when a man and his 8-year-old son were struck by a truck.
The father claimed damages for the emotional distress caused when
he

observed

his

son

killed

in the accident.

.Id. at

778-84.

While the Court did not consider the circumstances under which a
direct

victim may

recover damages

for negligent

emotional distress, it did provide some guidance.

infliction of
The majority

of the Court adopted the analysis of Section 313 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
part).

Ld. at 785 (Zimmerman, J. concurring in

Section 313 provides as follows:

5

Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion represented the views of the
majority of the Court on the issues it addressed because three other justices
concurred in his concurring opinion. Id. at 784 n.l.
-22-

(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he is subject to
liability to the other for resulting illness
or bodily harm if the actor
(a) should have realized that his
conduct involved an unreasonable
risk of causing the distress, otherwise than by knowledge of the
harm or peril of a third person,
and
(b) from facts known to him should
have realized that the distress, if
it were caused, might rtesult in
illness or bodily harm.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) has no
application to illness or bodily harm of
another which is caused by emotional distress
arising solely from harm or periil to a third
person, unless the negligence of the actor
has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of
bodily harm to the other.
Restatement
Although

the

(Second)
Court

of

Torts

S 313

(]J965)

the

diflficulty

recognized

(emphasis
of

added).

applying

a

"zone-of-danger" rule in the case of a bystander plaintiff, it
also recognized that Section 313 provides an objective standard
to identify those who are eligible to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Considering the alterna-

tives, the Court thought it best "to adopt as the test for determining

liability for the negligent

infliction of emotional dis-

tress the standards set forth in Section 313 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (1965), as explained in the comments accompanying that section."
The court

Id. at 785.
in Johnson was primarily concerned with the

application of the provision
In

the

present

case,

in subsectibn

plaintiffs

-23-

are

(2) of Section 313.

nc^t seeking

damages

for

emotional distress arising out of harm or peril to a third person; they are seeking damages as direct victims.
tion (2) is inapplicable.
the present case.

Thus, subsec-

Subsection (1) addresses the issue in

It imposes liability only for "resulting ill-

ness or bodily harm."

It does not create a cause of action for

mere physiological disturbance.

Comment

"a" to subsection (1)

provides:
a.
The rule stated in this Section does not
give protection to mental and emotional tranquility in itself. In general, as stated in
S 436A, there is no liability where the
actor's negligent conduct inflicts only emotional distress, without resulting bodily
harm or any other invasion of the other's
interests. Such emotional distress is important only in so far as its existence involves
a risk of bodily harm, and as affecting the
damages recoverable if bodily harm is sustained. See S 903.
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 303 comment a (emphasis added).
The comment refers to Section 436A which provides:
If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either
bodily harm or emotional disturbance to
another, and it results in such emotional
disturbance alone, without bodily harm or
other compensable damage. the actor is not
liable for such emotional disturbance.
Restatement

(Second) of Torts S 436A (1965) (emphasis added).

Under the guidelines set out in the Restatement, there must be
bodily harm or resulting illness in order to recover damages for
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
While the Utah Supreme Court has not expressly adopted
the provisions of Section 313 for determining when a direct victim may recover for negligent inflictions of emotional distress,
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it has suggested an analogous ana even mpre direct approach.

In

the recent case of Dallev v. Utah Valley JReqional Medical Center,
791 P.2d 193 (Utah 1990), the Court held that a direct victim may
recover for mental anguish only as an element of general damages.
In Dallev, a hysterectomy patient received a burn on her leg during surgery while she was under a general anesthetic.
again

referring

to Section

313 of the Restatement

The Court,
(Second) of

Torts, noted that the plaintiff was the only person injured and
that, because of her condition, she did not witness the injury.
The Court stated:
The possible mental and emotional damages
suffered by plaintiff as a result of a personal physical injury are compensable through
special damages and general damages for pain
and suffering "covering not c^nly the pain
associated with the injury but also the mental reaction to that pain and tb the possible
consequences of the injury."
Id. at 201 (citations omitted).

The Court distinguished Johnson

v. Rogers, in which the plaintiff was a bystander:
The difference in the two theories is that
awards for pain and suffering rbsult when the
emotion trauma arises from the physical
injury and awards for negligently inflicted
emotional distress arise when physical or
mental illness results from the emotional
trauma itself.
Id.
ing

Under the approach adopted in Dalley, a direct victim seekto recover

for negligent

infliction

of

emotional

distress

must either demonstrate some physical injtiry that accompanies the
initial event, or some later-manifested injury or illness caused
by the emotional trauma of the event.
no

cause of

action until

the bodily

-25-

In either case, there is
h^rm or

illness appears.

Once bodily harm or illness is manifest, the claimant may recover
damages for mental anguish as part of general damages.

Psycho-

logical harm or mental illness resulting from emotional trauma
may satisfy the requirement of "bodily harm or illness," but the
psychological harm must be sufficiently severe to amount to reasonably certain proof of damages.

See Restatement

(Second) of

Torts S 436A comment c (1965) (continued mental disturbance may
amount to "substantial bodily harm").
Applying

Section

313, the Arizona Court

of

Appeals

affirmed the trial court's dismissal of an emotional distress
claim on facts very similar to those of the present case.

In

Burns v. Jaouavs Min. Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. App. 1987), the
claimants' expert opined that the claimants' emotional distress
had caused them psychosomatic injuries consisting of "headaches,
acid indigestion, weeping, muscle spasms, depression and insomnia."

id. at 32.

The court found that such symptoms were only

"transitory physical phenomena" and "not the type of bodily harm
which would sustain a cause of action for emotional distress."
Id.

The court

relied on comment

c to Section

436A of the

Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides as follows:
The rule [preventing recovery for emotional
disturbance alone] applies to all forms of
emotional disturbance, including temporary
fright, nervous shock, nausea, grief, rage,
and humiliation.
The fact that these are
accompanied
by
transitory,
non-recurring
physical phenomena, harmless in themselves,
such as dizziness, vomiting, and the like,
does not make the actor liable where such
phenomena are in themselves inconsequential
and do not amount to any substantial bodily
harm. On the other hand, long continued nausea or headaches may amount to physical illness, which is bodily harm; and even long
-26-

c o n t i n u e d mental d i s t u r b a n c e , as for example
in t h e c a s e of r e p e a t e d h y s t e r i c a l a t t a c k s ,
or mental a b e r r a t i o n , may be| c l a s s i f i e d by
t h e c o u r t s as i l l n e s s , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e i r
mental c h a r a c t e r . . . "
I d , a t 32 ( q u o t i n g Restatement (Second) of T o r t s S 436A comment c
(1965)).

The c o u r t concluded t h a t

ff

[ t ] h e r e can be no c l a i m

for

damages for t h e f e a r of c o n t r a c t i n g a s b $ s t o s - r e l a t e d d i s e a s e s
the

future

without

P.2d a t 32.
sion

and

the manifestation

of a b o d i l y

The c l a i m a n t ' s h e a d a c h e s , a c i d i n d i g e s t i o n ,

insomnia

did

not

amount

to

bodily

injury

meaning of t h e r u l e s e t out in t h e R e s t a t e m e n t .
sidering

injury."

cases

of

exposure

to

asbestos

have

effect."

758

depres-

within

the

Many c o u r t s conheld

that

a n g u i s h i s not a c t i o n a b l e " a b s e n t proof pf some p r e s e n t
harm or m e d i c a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e

in

mental
physical

E.g., DeStories v.

City

of P h o e n i x , 744 P.2d 705, 710 ( A r i z . A p p . 1 9 8 7 ) . 6
In t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , p l a i n t i f f ^
sitory,

non-recurring

anxiety

and s l e e p l e s s n e s s

t h e a l l e g e d exposure t o a s b e s t o s .
No p l a i n t i f f

sought

experienced only

treatment

for

( R . 2 5 3 , 2 6 4 - 6 5 , 2 9 0 - 9 1 , 3 1 1 , 330.)

as a r e s u l t

(R.25X, 272, 289, 310,
purely

emotional

No p l a i n t i f f

tranof

328.)

distress.

was ever

treated

f o r any p h y s i c a l harm as a r e s u l t of asbejstos exposure or mental

°
The following courts are among those that h^ve held that there must be
some physical harm in order to maintain a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress arising from exposure to asbestos: Herber v.
Johns-Manville, 785 F.2d 79, 85 (3rd. Cir. 1986); Adams v. Johns-Manville, 783
F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1985); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d
1129, 1138 (5th Cir. 1985); Cathcart v. Keene Industrial Installation, 324
P.A. Super. 123, 471 A.2d 493, 507-08 (Pa. Super. 1984); Mergenthaler v.
Asbestos Corp. of America, 480 A.2d 647, 651 (Del. Sup. 1984); Nutt v.
A.C.&S., Inc., 466 A.2d 18, 25-26 (Del. Sup. 1983), aff'd, 480 A.2d 647 (Del.
1984).
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(Id.)

distress.

No plaintiff has been diagnosed

as having

"cancerphobia" or any other significant psychological
tional disturbance relating to exposure to asbestos.

or emoNo plain-

tiff has even demonstrated sufficient concern about his present
or future health to seek a medical examination.
Battigelli

told all of the plaintiffs

Indeed, Dr.

that their exposure to

asbestos at Mountain Fuel's facility was "limited and perhaps
inconsequential" (R.373.), and he told Silcox that he had nothing
to worry about.

(R.339.)

Plaintiffs have proffered no evidence

of severe emotional distress and no evidence of bodily harm or
mental illness that might form the basis for a claim for emotional distress.
If this Court were to reverse the District Court's dismissal

of

plaintiffs' claim

for emotional

distress

it would

invite an unlimited number of claims for emotional distress, an
injury that is easily feigned.

The law must separate the genuine

from the spurious claims for emotional injury, and the foregoing
authorities draw that line squarely within the requirements of
Utah law.

The District Court correctly ruled that, on the undis-

puted evidence, plaintiffs' claim for emotional distress must be
dismissed.
C#

Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Damages For
Medical Surveillance.
Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages for medical sur-

veillance because they have proffered no evidence demonstrating
that medical surveillance is reasonably necessary to detect and
treat illness that may result from exposure to asbestos.

-28-

In support of t h e i r claim for medical s u r v e i l l a n c e damages, p l a i n t i f f s

c i t e s e v e r a l c a s e s in which the claimants were
7
exposed t o t o x i c chemicals.
In t h e i r a n a l y s i s of the elements
necessary

to support

plaintiffs
Elec.

had

kidney,

684 F.Supp.

.

liver

it

specially
.

850

toxic

(M.D. Pa.
chlorinated

suspected

of

.

birth defects,

. cancer,

causing

damages,

Westinqhouse

1988).

In Merry,

hydrocarbons

"numerous

that

illnesses,

damage to human c e l l s ,

and brain damage, as w e l l as damage to the human

immune system,"
that

847,

were exposed to

been

including,

surveillance

r e l y on the c r i t e r i a s e t out in Merry v.

Corp.,

plaintiffs

a claim for medical

Id.

at 848.

There was expert medical

would be " c l i n i c a l l y
tailored

medical

prudent

and a d v i s a b l e

surveillance

program

to
for

. . [exposed] to a v a r i e t y of c h l o r i n a t e d hydrocarbons

ing t o l u e n e and x y l e n e ,

.

.

.

opinion
develop
persons
includ-

[chemicals] known to be systemic

p o i s o n s which can cause injury to m u l t i p l e organ s y s t e m s . "
at 8 5 1 .

Id.

There was a l s o testimony that persons exposed t o c h l o r i -

nated hydrocarbons were at a higher r i s k of cancer than the gene r a l population and should r e c e i v e "more i n t e n s i v e medical monit o r i n g than the general p o p u l a t i o n . "
ical

testimony).

The

court

IjJ. at 851-52 (quoting med-

considered

three

elements

to

be

'
Plaintiffs' primary cases involve exposure to toxic chemicals other than
asbestos. Ayers v. Jackson Township, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987)
(exposure to toxic chemicals leached from city landfill into claimant's water
supply); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847 (M.D. Pa. 1988)
(claim by property owners whose wells had been contaminated by toxic substances); Villari v. Terminix International, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 727 (E.D. Pa.
1987) (exposure to pesticide). Plaintiffs did not proffer medical opinion
that special diagnostic treatment for asbestos-related disease i s advisable.
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necessary

to recover damages

for medical surveillance:

"(1)

exposure to hazardous substances; (2) the potential for injury;
and (3) the need for early detection."

id. at 850.

While the

court easily found the first two requirements had been satisfied,
it noted that "[t]he second requirement presents a more difficult
question."

Ld. at 850.

After a lengthy discussion of the prob-

lem of quantifying the risk of future disease, the court concluded that claimants1 "enhanced risk of disease justifies periodic medical examinations."
The court

id. at 852.

in Merry unnecessarily introduced

into its

analysis an element of speculation, much like the speculation
inherent in an analysis for an enhanced-risk claim.

For a claim-

ant to prove "the potential for injury" he must speculate as to
the medical probabilities that injury will occur.

Under Utah

law, a claim for medical expenses may not be based on the probability that a disease will develop in the future.

Sawyers v.

F.M.A. Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986) (damages must
be proven with reasonable certainty).
The

New

Jersey

Supreme

Court

used

a

more

direct

approach, and a fairer one, in determining the requirements for
recovering medical surveillance damages.

In Avers v* Jackson

Township. 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987), the claimants
had been exposed to toxic pollutants in their water system.
toxicologist

testified that of 12 chemicals identified

plaintiffs* well water, four were known carcinogens.

A

in the

Other chem-

icals found in the water supply were known to produce "liver and
kidney damage, mutations and alterations
-30-

in genetic material,

damage to blood and reproductive systems, neurological damage and
skin

irrigations."

Ld. at 292.

The trial court,

damages for medical surveillance stated:

in awarding

"It is not the reason-

able probability of whether plaintiffs will suffer cancer in the
future that should determine whether medical surveillance is necessary. . . . Rather, it is whether it is necessary.
plaintiffs

are deprived

. . . because

. . .

If

they have no source of

funds . . . consequences may result in serious if not fatal illness."

Avers v. Jackson Township, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 572-73,

461 A.2d 184, 190 (1983).
The
court's

award

New
of

Jersey

Court

medical

of

Appeals

surveillance

vacated

damages,

the

holding

because the risk of injury was not reasonably probable.
Jackson
(1985).
appeals.

Township,

202

N.J.

Super.

106,

493

A.2d

trial
that

Ayers v.

1314,

1323

But the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the court of
It

reasonableness

rejected
of

an

medical

analysis

that

intervention,

assumes
and,

that

therefore,

"the
its

compensability, depends solely on the sufficiency of proof that
the

occurrence

of

disease

is

probable."

525

A.2d

at

309.

Instead, the court focused on whether medical surveillance would
be

reasonable

and

necessary.

The

New

Jersey

Supreme

stated:
[W]e hold that the cost of medical surveillance is a compensable item of damages where
the proofs demonstrate,
through
reliable
expert testimony predicated upon the significance and extent of exposures to chemicals,
the toxicity of the chemicals, the seriousness of the diseases for which individuals
are at risk, the relative increase in the
chance of onset of disease in those exposed,
and the value of early diagnosis, that such
surveillance
to
monitor
the
effect
or
-31-

Court

exposure to toxic chemicals is reasonable and
necessary.
525 A,2d at 312 (emphasis added).

In addition to evidence of

prolonged exposure to a variety of toxic substances, the claimants in Avers proffered testimony that medical surveillance would
improve the claimants' chances for detection and treatment of
chemically

induced illnesses.

Id.

Although the court denied

compensation for future disease, it held that medical surveillance damages may be awarded when surveillance would be reasonable and necessary.
In a case

involving

asbestos exposure,

the Arizona

Court of Appeals held that, under facts similar to those in the
present case, medical surveillance damages were not reasonable
and necessary.

In DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705

(Ariz. App. 1987), employees of a subcontractor hired to renovate
the lobby at the Phoenix airport were exposed to airborne asbestos during the demolition phase of the work.

The workers pre-

sented medical

to asbestos had

testimony that

their exposure

resulted in a significantly increased probability that they would
contract mesothelioma.

As in this case, however, there was no

testimony that any worker required "any particular increase in
the frequency, cost or intensity of . . . periodic medical examinations over what would normally have been prudent for them based
on their

individual circumstances."

id. at 711,

The court

affirmed the trial court's decision granting summary judgment for
defendants concluding that "plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence
that such expenses would be reasonably necessary."
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Id.

In the present case, plaintiffs presented no evidence
in the District Court to show that medical surveillance would be
reasonable and necessary.

The only physician to examine plain-

tiffs was Dr. Battigelli and he did not suggest that plaintiffs
would require any extraordinary medical surveillance.

id.

In

their brief on appeal, plaintiffs refer to various medical and
legal publications in support of their argument that medical surveillance damages are proper.

But the literature was not in evi-

dence in the District Court and there was no expert testimony
commenting on the literature.

The only medical expert involved

in this case concluded that plaintiff's exposure was limited and
probably inconsequential.
about it.

(R.373.)

He told them not to worry

(R.248.)
Plaintiffs proffered no other expert testimony regard-

ing the extent or significance of their exposure.

They presented

no evidence regarding the toxicity of the particular type of
asbestos involved.

They presented no expert testimony regarding

the value of early diagnosis or the necessity of specific diagnostic techniques to detect asbestos-related disease at an early
stage.

Finally, while it may be true that asbestos-related dis-

ease is best treated when detected early, there was no evidence
before

the

District

Court

to

suggest

that

early

requires anything more than routine health maintenance.

detection
The Dis-

trict Court's decision dismissing plaintiff's claims for medical
surveillance damages should be upheld because there is no indication that medical surveillance

is reasonable or necessary or

-33-

would result in detection of lung disease any earlier than would
regular, routine health examinations.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs in this case have demonstrated no presently
existing bodily injury.
dismissed

Accordingly, the district court properly

their claims for personal

distress.

injury and for emotional

Plaintiffs' claims for medical surveillance damages

were also properly dismissed because there was no evidence to
suggest

that medical surveillance

is reasonable and necessary

under these circumstances.
This case presents an important policy issue.
common knowledge
exposed

to

It is

that literally millions of people have been

asbestos,

PCB's,

polluted air or water.

dioxin:

toxic

chemicals,

and

Our society and our legal system must

develop meaningful guidelines to determine who among those millions have actionable claims.

The logical solution, recognized

in the Restatement and the cases cited above, is to require a
demonstrable bodily injury.
such

an

Plaintiffs presented no proof of

injury and the judgment below, therefore, should be

sustained.
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

defendants

respectfully

request that the Utah Supreme Court sustain the Third District
Court's judgment dismissing with prejudice all of plaintiffs'
claims for damages, including all claims for personal injury, for
negligent

infliction

of

emotional

surveillance.
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distress, and

for medical
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RAY G. GROUSSMAN (1263)
CHARLES E. GREENHAWT (4712)
180 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84139
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

TOM HANSEN, an individual;
DOUGLAS A. HILTON, an
individual; MIKE MACKINTOSH,
an individual; BRUCE SILCOX,
an individual; and RUSSELL
VICKERS, an individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY,
a Utah corporation;
ROGER BARRUS, an individual;
ROGER MORSE, an individual;
and JOHN DOES 1-25,
Defendants.
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY,
a Utah corporation;
ROGER BARRUS, an individual;
ROGER MORSE, an individual,

)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. 890900920 PI

)

)
)
)

Judge James S. Sawaya

Third-Party
Plaintiffs,
vs.

}

CCI MECHANICAL, INC.,
a Utah corporation (formerly
known as Climate Control, Inc.,
Third-Party
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

* * * * * * * *

The motion for summary judgment of defendants, Mountain
Fuel Supply Company, Roger Barrus and Roger Morse came on for a
hearing before the above-entitled court on May 21, 1990, at the
hour of two o'clock p.m.

Plaintiffs were represented by their

attorney, Paul D. Hatch, and defendants were represented by their
attorney, Gordon L. Roberts.

The Court, having considered the

memoranda filed by the parties in support of and in opposition to
such motion

and having heard the arguments and statements of

counsel, the Court being of the view that the Statute of Limitations

is not presently

running against any of the plaintiffs

because of the absence, at present, of any bodily injury, and
good cause appearing therefor,
IT

IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

that defendants'

motion for summary judgment is granted and plaintiffs' Complaint
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is dismissed with prejudice on the ground that no bodily injury
has been manifested in any plaintiff.
ENTERED this ^ ^

day of C^t^^n^

, 1990.

BY THE COURT

JAMES S. SAW.
T COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following on this

J*-

day of rW*&*-

* 1990.

Paul D. Hatch
James E. Morton
Ronald C. Wolthuis
HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
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